A model for financial intermediation and public intervention by Samartín Sáenz, Margarita
Working Paper 97-29 
Business Economics Series 04 
April 1997 
Departamento de Economia de la Empresa 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (341) 624-9608 
A MODEL FOR FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND PUBLIC INTERVENTION 
Margarita Samartfn' 
Abstract _______________________________ _ 
Based on Chari and Jagannathan (1988), this paper models information-induced and "pure-panic" 
runs in an environment of risk-averse agents. In this framework, deposits are needed to provide 
insurance against investors' unexpected demand for liquidity and therefore, a role for a financial 
intermediary is justified. A welfare analysis of two traditional devices to prevent runs (namely, 
suspension of convertibility versus deposit insurance), is presented. 
Key Words and Phrases 
Banking, Deposit Contracts, Deposit Insurance, Suspension of convertibility. 
'Samartfn, Departamento de Economia de la Empresa de la Universidad CarIos III de Madrid. 
email: samartin@emp.uc3m.es 
I thank Sudipto Bhattacharya and Heracles Polemarchakis for their comments and advice. 
Financial support from La Fundaci6n Marcelino Botin is gratefully acknowledged. 
A MODEL FOR FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIATION AND PUBLIC 
INTERVENTION 
Contents 
Introduction 3 
1.- A Description of the model 6 
1.1.- The banking contract: The ex-ante program. 7 
1.2.- The ex-post problem 11 
2.- Condition to assure a panic run 14 
3.- An example of application 16 
4.- Public intervention 19 
4.1.- Suspension of convertibility 19 
4.2.- Deposit insurance 22 
5.- Comparison among the different public intervention measures: numerical examples 23 
6.- Conclusions and suggestions for further research 25 
Appendix 27 
7.- Maximization problems 27 
7.1.- Ex-ante Contract 27 
7.2.- Ex-Post Problem 30 
8.- Proof of Proposition 1 32 
9.- Numerical Example 34 
References 38 
List of Tables 40 
List of Figures 44 
Notes 45 
1 
Introduction 
Due to all advances in infonnation economics and financial innovations, the theory of banking has been 
reconfigured in the last fifteen years. 
One of the basic issues analyzed in modern financial intennediation is the problem of bank failures and the study 
of the different intervention mechanisms in order to prevent them. 
Banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the United States until the 1930s. They have reemerged as a 
source of public concern and much theoretical research recently. 
Bank failures are important, not primarily in their own right but because of their indirect effect. They are a 
mechanism through which a drastic decline is produced in the stock of money and this last feature plays an 
important role in economic development. 
In the recent past, a stream of literature has begun to reexamine and extend the theses in prior research. 
Examples of such work include Kareken and Wall ace [19], Bryant [8], Bhattacharya [4], Diamond and Dybvig 
[12], Diamond and Dybvig [13], Bhattacharya and Gale [3], Chari and Jagannathan [9], Bhattacharya and Jacklin 
[2]. 
An important contribution in this area is the paper by Diamond and Dybvig [12]. They model bank runs as one 
of the two possible equilibria that are obtained in a two stage game of complete but imperfect infonnation. 
Diamond and Dybvig give a first explicit analysis of the demand for liquidity and the transfonnation service 
provided by banks. This transfonnation of illiquid assets into more liquid liabilities through the demand deposit 
contract gives a rationale for the existence of banks and at the same time for their vulnerability to runs. In this 
role, banks can be viewed as providing insurance for individuals subject to preference shocks. 
The demand deposit contract can improve on a competitive market by providing better risk-sharing among people 
who need to consume at different random times. If confidence is maintained there will be efficient risk-sharing; 
in this (Pareto-dominant) equilibrium only those agents who have a genuine preference for early consumption 
will make an early withdrawal. However, if agents panic, incentives are distorted and the bank-run equilibrium 
will occur. 
In the bank run equilibrium all individuals withdraw at date I, fearing withdrawals by others; this equilibrium 
3 
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is socially inefficient: it provides allocations that are worse for all agents than those they would have obtained 
if they had waited until date.2 to withdraw and the bank is forced to liquidate its long-term technology at a loss. 
Bhattacharya and Gale [3] consider a variation of the Diamond and Dybvig model in which there are many 
intermediaries that are subject to privately observed liquidity shocks. They show that unconstrained walrasian 
trading among intermediaries would lead to underinvestment in the liquid asset and therefore demonstrate the 
welfare gains from setting up an institution such as a central bank, offering borrowing and lending opportunities 
at a subsidized rate. 
In a very similar framework, Bhattacharya and Jacklin [2] examine the relative degrees of risk-sharing provided 
by bank deposit and traded equity contracts. They characterize a relationship between the riskiness and 
information of the stream of returns and the desirability of equity over deposit contracts. (The basic result is that 
deposit contracts tend to the better for financing low risk assets). 
An interesting addition to this literature is the paper by Chari and Jagannathan [9], which models two types of 
bank runs, information-induced runs, that is, runs that arise due to negative information about the bank's 
solvency, and pure panic runs, that occur even when no one has any adverse information. They showed that 
where there is uncertainty about both asset returns and the proportion of early withdrawal seekers, sometimes 
runs occur even though there is no adverse information held by any agent. The reason is that uninformed 
individuals condition their beliefs on the size of the withdrawal queue at the bank. If this size is large enough 
due to many agents wishing to consume early they may infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to 
fail and precipitate a bank run. In their model, extra market constraints, such as suspension of convertibility, can 
prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations. 
The main criticism to Chari and Jagannathan's model was that it implied no apparent role for a bank or other 
financial intermediary; as individuals were risk neutral. 
This paper introduces risk-averse preferences in Chari and Jagannatban's model. 
A first motivation for this extension is to give a positive role for a financial intermediary in the economy, by 
providing insurance to individuals subject to preference shocks. As already shown in Diamond Dybvig, it is this 
important liquidity insurance service what gives a rationale for the existence of banks and for their vulnerability 
to runs. This extended framework considers this valuable service performed by banks, and shows how 
coordination problems may arise from deposit contracting. 
In the ex-ante period, depositors invest their endowment in the bank and are offered a menu of contracts. In the 
interim period, individuals select their withdrawal stream (given their liquidity needs or information received 
concerning bank asset quality). A large withdrawal queue size at the bank may be due to an important liquidity 
shock or to negative information about asset returns. Uninformed agents cannot distinguish between these two 
shocks and as a result, in some states of nature all individuals choose to withdraw their deposits from the bank 
(although sometimes there may be no adverse information held by any agent). 
Conditions to assure bank runs are derived without having abstracted from the important issues that banks 
perform. 
A second motivation for this extension is to complete Chari and Jagannathan's welfare analysis, by comparing 
suspension of convertibility versus deposit insurance, given their relative benefits and costs (of randomization 
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in meeting liquidity needs or dead weight taxation). In this framework, suspension does no longer lead to an 
improvement of ex-ante utility and is not always the preferred instrument to cope with runs. The level of relative 
risk-aversion is crucial to determine the choice between the two policies. The numerical results show that if 
individuals are not very risk-averse, suspension would be welfare superior, for higher levels of risk-aversion 
deposit insurance would be better, and finally, for very high levels of risk-aversion suspension is again preferred. 
The range of parameters for which either measure is preferred also depends on the distribution function of the 
random return, the value of the dead weight tax and the random proportion of type 1 agents in the economy. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: The basic framework of the model is presented in section 2, the ex-ante 
(banker's) contract and the ex-post (depositors') problems are defined in sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. A 
condition to assure a panic run is derived in section 3 and numerical computations are given in section 4. Two 
traditional devices in order to prevent runs are described in section 5 and a welfare comparison of both measures 
is presented in section 6. Section 7 ends the paper with some conclusions with respect to the above public 
measures and suggestions for further research. 
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1.- A Description of the model 
The model can be summarized as follows: 
a.- Hypotheses 
i.- Three period economy, T=O, 1,2 
ii.- A single commodity. 
iii.- Investment technology: There are two investment technologies on the side of the intermediary: 
• A short-term asset at T=O that yields one unit at T=1 
• A long-term asset at T=O that yields a random return R at T=2. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that the long-term technology cannot be liquidated early (or equivalently, 
only at a loss)'. 
The random return is defined as follows: 
RE(Rh,Rl) with p.df(1-p,p) and RI-O [1] 
It is also assumed that the probability of the low return occurring (P), is sufficiently small. 
iv.- Preferences: There is a continuum of ex-ante identical agents at T=O that maximize expected 
utility of consumption. They are subject at T=l to a privately observed uninsurable risk of 
being of either of two types. 
• Type-I agents derive only utility from consumption in period one. 
• Type-2 agents derive utility from consumption in both periods I and 2, i.e: 
Type-l agents UI(cl'c2,PI)=PIU(cI)+(I-PI)U(c2) 
Type-2 agents U2(CI'C2,P2) =P2U(CI) +(1-P2)U(c2) 
It is assumed that O~p2<PI~1 and PI-I. 
The proportion of type-l agents is stochastic and defined as: 
tE(tl't2) with p.df(rl'r2) and r l +r2 =1 
tl <t2 
v.- Initial endowments: All agents are endowed with one unit of the good at T=O. 
[2] 
[3] 
vi.- Information: At T=1 a random fraction, ii, of type-2 individuals receives information about 
time 2 returns2• 
It is assumed that this information is perfect. 
The random variable ii, is defined as follows: 
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ii E (0, et) with p.d! (l-q, q) [4] 
It is observed that in some states of nature, there will be no informed agents in the model. 
As in Chari and Jagannathan, the random proportion of type-! agents is needed in order to create 
confusion between a large withdrawal queue size at the bank due to liquidity shocks, t2 realized, or 
negative information shocks. 
vii.- Parameter restrictions: In order for individuals to have a non-trivial signalling extraction 
problem, the following parameter restriction is assumed, (it will become clear why this 
assumption is needed). 
[5] 
Vlll.- Utility functions: Considering the agents' preferences hypothesis and in order to get numerical 
results, the following form for the utility function is assumed: 
[6] 
where k is a constant and i = 1, 2.3 
b.- Data 
The state of nature is described by the vector e = (t, ii, R) that contains the 3 random variables that 
are i.i.d. 
In Table n, the expressions for the different states of nature and its associated probabilities are given. 
1 .1.- The banking contract: The ex-ante program. 
As it was mentioned in the introduction, banks perform an important service by transforming highly illiquid 
assets into more liquid deposits. In this role, banks can be viewed as providing insurance to individuals that are 
uncertain about their future time preferences or liquidity needs. The demand deposit contract allows agents to 
consume whenever they need it, as it satisfies a sequential service constraint. 
Formally, the demand deposit contract may be defined as a contract that requires an initial investment atT=O 
with the intermediary in exchange for the right to withdraw per unit of initial investment (at the discretion of 
depositor and conditional on the bank's solvency) either: 
a.- c 11 units in period 1 and C2l units in period 2 
b.- cl2 units in period 1 and c22 units in period 2 
As shown by Jacklin [16], the demand deposit contract optimally combines the two types of deposits that banks 
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usually hold, a time deposit and a more typical demand deposit contract. 
That is, at T=O or ex-ante period, individuals deposit their unit of endowment at the bank and are offered a 
menu of contracts. At T=l or interim period, depositors select their preferred contract (given their liquidity needs 
or information received). 
A combination of these contracts could also be possible, in this case, it could be seen as depositors being allowed 
to withdraw at T=l part of the second period withdrawal stream (subject to some early withdrawal penaltyt 
It should be observed that the contract between the bank and depositors takes place at T=O, before neither the 
liquidity nor information shocks are realized. A summary of events is given in Table I. 
In mathematical terms, the optimal contract choice for a deposit contract in the absence of interim information 
can be obtained as the solution to the following problem: 
[7] 
s.t. tClI +(1-t)C12~K [8] 
iC21 +(1-i)c22~(1-K)R 
~ [Ui(c1j'C2i'Pj)]~~ [Ui(cli,C2i,Pj)] for i~}; i,j=1,2 
R R 
[9] 
where: 
C1j Consumption at time T=l for the type j agent 
c2j Consumption at time T=2 for the type j agent dependent on the random return R (c2iR)) 
K Investment in the liquid short-lived asset at T=O 
l-K Investment in the iIliquid long-lived asset at T=O 
R Random return of the long-lived asset at T=2. 
The first two constraints are resource balance constraints and the last two are incentive compatibility constraints 
that guarantee that type-l depositors will prefer their withdrawal stream to the type-2 withdrawal stream and 
viceversa, that is, the contract is designed so that depositors self-select their type contract. 
In the above maximization problem both t (the proportion of type-l agents) and R (the return on the long-term 
asset) are random variables. 
A first simplification to the problem has been done by substituting t by its expected value t=t1r1 +t2r 2 . The 
bank solves its ex-ante program for the average proportion of type-l agentss. 
Taking this into consideration, the maximization problem defined by equations (7), (8) and (9) is approximated 
as follows: 
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s.t. [11] 
~ [Uj(Clj,C2j,Pj)]~~ [Ui(Cli,C2i,Pj)] for i*j; i,j=I,2 
R R 
[12] 
where the two resource constraints have been substituted by a unique constraint. 
The second type of uncertainty reflects the fact that, having invested in a risky technology, the bank may not 
be able to make its promised second period payments in full. One way to think of this, is that the bank promises 
an amount (C21, cn ) it will be able to pay if R=Rh. If R=RI really occurs, the bank is considered insolvent 
and depositors get RI of their promised payments. It is then assumed that: 
Rh 
C2.=C2. R (j=1,2) I I Rh [13] 
Given this dependence between consumption and returns, the above maximization problem is reformulated as 
follows": 
s.t. 
max 
Cv 
( 
(k+c )I-y [(k+C )I-Y]) 
t 11 +(I-)E 21 + PI 1 PI 1 
-y -y 
( 
(k+c )I-y [(k+C )I-Y]) 
+(I-t) P2 12 +(I- P2)E 22 l-y l-y 
( C
21 ) ( C22 ) t C II + Rh + (1 - t) C 12 + Rh = 1 
(k+c )I-Y [(k+C )I-Y] (k+c )1-y [(k+C )I-Y] 
PI 11 +(I-PI)E 21 ~Pl 12 +(1-Pl)E 22 
l-y l-y l-y l-y 
(k+c )1-
y 
[(k+C )1-Y] (k+c )1-
y 
[(k+C )I-Y] 
P2 12 +(I-P2)E 22 ~P2 11 +(I-P2)E 21 
l-y l-y l-y l-y 
[14] 
[15] 
and where AI' A2, A3 are the mUltipliers associated with the corresponding resource and incentive constraints. 
Given that the ex-ante probability of RI is sufficiently small, the ex-ante contract has been approximated ignoring 
consumption changes produced by interim signals. 
Considering the relationship cij = cij + k and applying Kunh-Tucker conditions, the optimal solution is obtained. 
If the value of y is such that the following inequation7 is satisfied: 
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.l-y .l-y .l-y .l-y 
C12 C22 Cll C2l P2- + (I-P2) (l-p) - ~ P2- + (1- P2) (l-p)-
l-y l-y l-y l-y 
[16] 
the optimal consumption levels are: 
[17] 
[18] 
Otherwise, the optimal consumption levels are: 
[19] 
[20] 
and where e12 is obtained as a solution to the following non-linear equation: 
[21] 
and, 
[22] 
B= t 
(l-t) P2 (M)-y Bp2c~i - t 
Lemma 1.- The optimal demand deposit contract satisfies: Cll >C12 and C22>C2l mO 
Proof: See Appendix I.A for a detailed resolution of the problem. 
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1.2.- The ex-post problem 
In the interim stage, the liquidity and information shocks are realized, and so every individual learns his type 
and also some type-2 agents will be informed about the return of the long-term asset at T=2. Individuals will 
select the contract they prefer (given their liquidity needs or information received) in order to maximize their 
utility function, (the choices of the individuals are defined by the dimensionless coefficients Ill' III and 112 
respectively. See footnote 4). 
As will be seen in this subsection, type-l individuals will withdraw for liquidity reasons while informed type-2 
agents withdraw whenever they receive negative information concerning the return of the long-term asset. 
Finally, uninformed type-2 agents condition their beliefs about the long term return on the size of the withdrawal 
queue at the bank. This size could be large due to many agents wishing to consume early (liquidity shock), or 
because some individuals have received a negative information shock. As uninformed agents cannot distinguish 
between these two shocks, in some states of nature, individuals may end up withdrawing their deposits from the 
bank, although their is no adverse information held by any agent. 
The behaviour of the different agents is formulated as follows: 
a).- Type-l agents 
The value of III is chosen in order to maximize their utility function and subject to their two period constraint; 
that is: 
max 
I 1 (k+c/- V [(k+C2)I-V]) U (Cl'C2,PI)=max PI +(I-PI)E -....::...-
1'1 1'1 l-y l-y 
s.t Cl =c 12 + Il I (Cll -CI2) 
[23] 
c2 =C21 + (1-Il I)(c22 -C21) 
1l1~1 
The solution to the type-l problem is given by Lemma 2: 
Lemma 2.- Absent any information, type-l agents will always select their own contract, that is, the optimal 
solution to the type-l problem is 1l~=1 (cll' c21 ). 
Proof: See Appendix I.B. 
The solution to the type-l problem is trivial, as these individuals do not care about second period consumption, 
therefore they will withdraw to consume in the interim period. 
b).- InfOlmed type-2 agents. 
In each state and conditional on the information about R they solve the following problem: 
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with: Cl =C12 + 1l1(Cll -CI2) 
C2 =C21 + (1-11 [Hcn -C21) 
IlI~1 
[25] 
There are two different values for Ill' depending on the information about R received by these agents at T=l. 
b 1 ).- If R=Rh is the information received at date 1, then the informed type-2 agents find their consumption 
by solving the following problem: 
1 (k+C)I-V [Ck+C)I-Vj 1) max P2 I + (I-P2)E 2 R=Rh ~ l-y l-y 
with Cl =C12 + 1l[(Cll -CI2) 
C2 =C21 + (1- I-l [)(C22 -c21) 
I-lI!> 1 
[26] 
[27] 
Lemma 3.- If type-2 agents receive positive information concerning the asset's return, they would choose a 
combination of the two contracts, that is: 
[28] 
Proof: See Appendix LB. 
b2).- If R=Rl is the value of R revealed to type-2 agents, then the level of consumption is obtained in a 
similar way as above: 
{ 
(k+C)I-V [(k+C)I-V j]) 
max Pz 1 +(1-pz)E z R=Rl 
~ l-y l-y 
[29] 
with: Cl=cI2+I-lI(cll-cI2) 
C2=C21 +(1-Il[)(C22 -C21) [30] 
Ill!> 1 
The solution to this problem is given by Lemma 4: 
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Lemma 4.- If type-2 agents receive negative information concerning the asset's return they will always claim 
the type-l contract that is, tl)e optimal solution is 11;=1 (cll' C21 ). 
Proof: See Appendix LB. 
c).- Uninformed type-2 agents. 
These agents maximize expected utility conditional on the observation of a noisy signal, which is the withdrawal 
queue size at the bank, or equivalently, the level of aggregate demanded consumption (CT) at T= 1. The 
coefficient 112 =1l2(C1) is chosen in order to maximize: 
S.t. Cl =C12 + 1l2(cU -C lz) 
c2 =C21 + (1-1l2)(c22 -C21) 
1l2~1 
[31] 
It should be noticed that aggregate demanded consumption could be high either because the proportion of type-l 
agents is large or because informed agents have received negative information concerning the asset's return at 
T=2, this confusion is crucial to the results. 
The value of CT depends on each state of nature 0 = (t, ii, R) with probability p(O) and its expression is: 
[32] 
and where cCII represents the consumption at date I of type-I agents (value of Cl obtained in (a» andccl2I , CCI2 
that of informed and uninformed type-2 agents respectively (obtained in (b) and the value of Cl to be found as 
a result to the above problem). 
The values of CT are shown in Table 11. It should be observed that there for any 112 (C1) or equivalently any 
consumption level (cc I2 ), uninformed agents may choose, there is always confusion between states 3 and 4 as 
type-l's consumption at T=l (cc lI ) is clI and informed type-2's consumption in the case of a negative 
information shock (CC IZL ) is also clI . 
More generally, let e* CT be defined as the finite set e\CT' e' 2.CT' .... e· N.CT of all the states of nature that give 
for the same value of 1l2=1l2(C1) the same value of aggregate consumption. The probability of state e';,CT is: 
[33] 
The set of N states of nature can be divided into 2 groups. The first NI states correspond to R=Rl and the lastN2 
to the case R=Rh. On the other side, given the independence of the random variables equation (33) can be 
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rewritten: 
(e ' I cn P(t*ICT)p(a:iCT) p =' 'P=Tt.p ~T N I if O<i<N1 
LP(e'I,cr) 
i=l 
P(e". I cn= p(t·I,CT)P(a. \cr> (l-p)=Tt .(l-p) I,CT N I 
LP(e"I,CT) 
1=1 
And so the problem defined by (31) is reformulated as follows: 
where: 
with solution: 
S.t. C1=C12 + 1l2(CU -C12) 
c2 =C21 + (1-112) (C22 -C21) 
1l2~1 
N NI 
Tt; =(l-p) :E Tti Tt; =p:E Tti 
i=l+NI 1=1 
CClI =C12 + III (CII -CI2 ) =cII Aggregate consumption of type-l agent at time T=l 
cCI2 Aggregate consumption of uninformed type-2 agent at time T=l 
[34] 
[35] 
[36] 
[37] 
[38] 
Aggregate consumption of informed type-2 agent at time T=l depending on the information: 
Rh, RI. 
If t2 = tl + a. (1 - t l ) then there is confusion between states 3 and 4 due to the fact that, 
CC I2L = C12 + (1l1=1)(cu - c I2 )= Cu 
2.- Condition to assure a panic run 
Bank runs occur whenever uninformed type-2 agents start making type-l withdrawals upon observation of 
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aggregate consumption at T= 1 . 
Conditions for both information-induced and pure panic runs to occur are given by Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1.- In the model, bank runs occur as a unique equilibrium, if the following conditions hold: 
[39] 
(
Ri I-y 
(k+c )I-y (k )I-y k+C22-> 12 (I ) +c2Z Rh 
P2 1 + -P2 1t1 + 1t2,,~ 
-y l-y ~o() l-y .~ 
[40] 
where: 
1t = (I-p) (I-q) 
1t2~_1 
p 
I~-l l-q+pq I-q+pq [41] 
(1-p)r2 p[r)q+r2 (1-q)] 
1t )~o() r)pq + rz (I-q) + rz (l-p)q 1t2~oo() r)pq +r2 (I-q) +r2(I-p)q 
and cl' c2 as defined in the uninformed type-2 agents maximization problem. 
Proof: See Appendix 11. 
If these conditions are satisfied there are bank-runs in states 3, 4 and 6 and the levels of aggregate demanded 
consumption are the ones given by column 5 in Table 11. It is observed that aggregate demanded consumption 
in those states is cll ' which exceeds ex-ante planned consumption at T=I or the investment in the liquid asset 
K. In fact, 
[42] 
and CU >CI2 by definition of the optimal deposit contract. 
Whenever the withdrawal queue size at the bank exceeds the ex-ante investment in the liquid asset, the bank 
suspends convertibility, as will be seen in subsection IV.A. 
In all these cases, bank runs occur as a unique equilibrium, in states 3 and 6 there are information-induced runs 
as there is a negative information shock, however in state 4 there is a pure panic run as there is no adverse 
information held by any agent in this state. As already mentioned it may arise due to a confusion in the 
observation of aggregate consumption at T= 1 , it models the idea that runs may be a contagion phenomenon, in 
which individuals observing long lines at the bank, they infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about 
to fail and precipitate a bank run. 
The fact that there is a probability of having informed agents in the model makes this type of runs possible. 
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3.- An example of application 
In order to plot a numerical solution for the just mentioned model an example of application has been developed 
for the following input data8• 
An example of Public intervention in Financial Intermediation 
t1, t2 ...... 0.30 
r1, r2 ...... 0.99 
0, alpha .... 0.00 
q, l-q ...... 0.90 
0.51 
0.01 
0.30 
0.10 
Proportions of type-1 agents 
Probabilities of the above proportions 
Proportions of informed type-2 agents 
Probabilities of the above proportions 
Low and high random returns Rl, Rh ...... 1e-20 1.50 
Probabilities of the low and high returns 
Liquidation cost 
Minimum risk-aversion coefficient 
p, 1-p ...... 0.10 0.90 
aa .......... 0.00 
gamma1 ...... 0.30 
Maximum risk-aversion coefficient gamma2 ...... 3.50 
Incrementum of the risk-aversion coefficient dgamma ...... 0.10 
Intertemporal coefficients of types 1, 2 agents rhol, rho2 .. 0.99 0.50 
The ex-ante optimal demand deposit contract is shown in Figure I for different values of the risk-aversion 
coefficient. 
Figure 2 illustrates ex-ante aggregate consumption (planned by the bank) and ex-post aggregate demanded 
consumption for all states of nature and for y =1.5.9 It can be seen that in states 3, 4 and 6 aggregate demanded 
consumption exceeds the ex-ante one, in these states there are bank runs as all depositors choose the type-l 
withdrawal stream lO and the bank cannot meet all withdrawals. In states 3 and 6 there are information-induced 
runs as there is a negative information shock, but in state 4 there is a "pure panic" run as there is no adverse 
information held by any agent. 
It is assumed that a subsidy can be received from the government so that type-I withdrawals are always feasible 
(when the highest i is realized). 
Figure 3 shows that the conditions of Proposition I are satisfied in this example. The expected utility in states 
3 and 4 attains its highest value for Il = 1 . 
As it was mentioned before, "panic runs" occur because there is a probability of having informed agents in the 
model. 
Figure 4 gives the threshold level of q (probability of informed agents) above which the conditions of 
Proposition 1 are satisfied, that is, "panic" runs occur. 
This threshold level has been derived by solving inequations (39) and (40) in q (for the exogenously fixed 
parameters PI' P2' tl' t2, rI' r 2, Rh, RI, p, y). 
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4.- Public intervention 
Banks perform a very valuable function, which is to transform highly illiquid assets into more liquid liability 
payoffs through the demand deposit contract. This transformation service gives a rationale for the existence of 
banks and at the same time for their vulnerability to runs. 
Coordination problems derived from deposit contracting have been considered important due to the fear of 
systematic risk. An example may be found in the banking panics that ocurred in the 1930s and the strict 
regulation that was imposed as a reaction to the crisis. 
However, although some of these measures have been effective in preventing bank runs, they have created 
additional problems, which gives a starting point for banking regulation. 
The aim of this section is to analyze two devices that have traditionally been used by banks in order to prevent 
runs, namely suspension of convertibility (of deposits into currency) and deposit insurance. 
The costs of suspension of convertibility (in randomization in meeting liquidity needs) versus deposit insurance 
(in deadweight taxation) will be compared. 
4.1 .- Suspension of convertibility 
It is a measure that banks have historically used against runs, in the pre-deposit insurance era. 
During the 19th and early 20th the American Banking System suspended convertibility eight times. In each case, 
suspension was the response to a banking panic which was coincident (or nearly so) with a business cycle peak. 
A curious aspect of suspension is that neither banks, depositors nor the courts opposed to it at any time. Gorton 
[15] shows that this accommodating behaviour arose because suspension was part of a mutually beneficial 
arrangement. 
In Diamond and Dybvig [12], a policy of suspension of convertibility attains the Pareto dominant equilibrium 
if there is no aggregate uncertainty with respect to the proportion of early diers; otherwise this measure would 
not be so effective". 
In Chari and Jagannathan [9], a suspension clause improves on the ex-ante utility, however it is not a first-best 
measure as some early diers would not get all their withdrawal stream when there are many of them. 
In the following pages, this measure is introduced into the model; suspension of convertibility occurs at the level 
of the highest proportion of early diers, that is: 
[43] 
where K is the investment planned ex-ante by the bank in the liquid asset and G is a subsidy received from the 
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government in order to cover withdrawals up to the highest proportion of early diers. 
However, in the ex-post situation, there may be some states of nature for which the value of aggregate 
consumption CTI is greater than the assumed ex-ante one. 
The value of the aggregate demanded consumption CTI in state 6=(i, ii, R) at T=l is given by the expression: 
[44] 
Then, the deficit ll.C-TI is defined as follows: 
[45] 
if CTI<K+G 
This deficit in the consumption has to be shared among the different agents. There exist several ways to carry 
out this deficit distribution, three alternative mechanisms will be discussed here, namely: 
a.- A constant deduction of the consumption among all type-2 agents. 
b.- A proportional deduction of the consumption among all type-2 agents. 
C.- The consumption deficit is completely supported by the last agents trying to convert their returns. 
In the first two alternatives it is assumed that type-l agents are always first in line to get their withdrawal stream 
and therefore the consumption deficit will be shared only among type-2 agents. In the third alternative, depositors 
are treated on a first-come-first-served-basis, and so the available funds are allocated randomly among all 
depositors. 
In the following, the fonnulation for each alternative is given. 
Alternative (a) 
ll.CT1 In this alternative there is a constant deduction of consumption among all type-2 agents, defined as: aa = --. 
l-i 
The resulting consumption levels of infonned (CC~21' cc:21 ) and uninfonned type-2 agents (cc~2' cc:2) are: 
[46] 
a CC221 = CC22I 
Alternative (b) 
In this situation, the consumption levels of type-2 agents are diminished proportionally to their demanded 
consumption, therefore, the proportion of the total to be divided is: 
ab= ______ ll._C_T~I ___ __ 
ii (l-i)ccl21 +(l- ii)(l-i)ccI2 
where: infonned type-2 support r,r=cc l21 r,b and 
[47] 
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uninfonned type-2 support l)2=CC12 l)b. 
The modified consumption levels of infonned and uninfonned type-2 agents would be: 
[48] 
b CC22 =CCZ2 
Alternative (c) 
In this alternative the available funds are allocated randomly among depositors. Let ~ be the random proportion 
of agents of each type that supports the deficit respect to the total number of the same type of agents, these 
agents will receive what was planned in the ex-ante analysis, i.e.: 
[49] 
or: 
~ = _ ~C-Tl _ 
(1 - t)[ci (cc lU - c lZ) + (1- ci)(ccl2 -c lZ) 1 +t (ccll -CI2) 
[50] 
It should be noted that ~ ~O because Ill' III and 112 are positive numbers and cCIl' cCIU and cc lZ >CI2 · 
In this alternative the consumptions are then: 
Type-l agents: 
cc;; =ccII for the ftrst (1 -~) i 
Cl 
cC2l "'ccZl type-1 agents [51] 
cc~~ =C12 for the last ~ i 
C2 CCZI =cc2l type-1 agents 
Infonned type-2 agents: 
Cl 
CCZ21 '" CCZ21 type -2 agents [52] 
cc ;~l = C lZ for the last ~ ci (1 - i) infonned 
c2 CCZ21 =CCZ21 type-2 agents 
Uninfonned type-2 agents: 
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CC~~=CCI2 for the first (l-~)(I-ii)(l-i) uninfonned 
Cl 2 CC22 =CC22 type- agents [53] 
CC~~=C12 for the last P(l-ii)(l-i) uninfonned 
C2 
CC22 = cC22 type -2 agents 
Given these modified consumption levels after suspension, the aggregate expected utility, UT' is defined as 
follows: 
[54] 
where e = 1, .. ,6 
where s =a, b, C and SI =S2 for alternatives a and b. 
The welfare measure to be considered in this study will be: 
cert.equivaIent(E UT) - G (1 + s) [55] 
The subsidy (G) would be like a deadweight tax on individuals of value s. 
4.2.- Deposit insurance 
In the V.S, this measure was first introduced in the Glass-Steagall Act, an important banking legislation reaction 
to the bank-runs that occurred during the Great Depression. 
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It has been the most successful device in order to prevent runs, however it has created problems of its own. 
There are two effects associated with deposit insurance: on one side, it encourages banks to take excessive risk 
and on the other side depositors have less incentives to monitor their bank under a deposit insurance system. 
As already shown in Bryant [8], deposit insurance eliminates incentives for agents to seek socially wasteful 
information in the presence of undiversifiable risk. 
Diamond-Dybvig [12] also advocate deposit insurance, but for a different reason, in their model, it adjusts for 
an aggregate shock, in the proportion of agents wishing to withdraw early. Deposit insurance also eliminates the 
Pareto-inferior equilibrium (bank-run) because the deposit contract schedule, conditioned of the realized aggregate 
shock, always has the feature that waiting to withdraw dominates early withdrawal, and so the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium can be implemented. 
In the model it is assumed that there is government deposit insurance of the bank deposits at T=2. 
This removes the incentives of agents to become informed and so information-induced runs will no longer occur. 
In this case, it is assumed that agents will consume what was planned in the ex-ante contract. 
Deposit insurance is introduced into the model as follows: 
Whenever the realized benefit at T=2, R (l-K) is less than the assumed consumption for that period, that is, 
te
zl + (l-t)C22 , the difference is always supplied by the government. The expected cost of the insurance would 
be: 
Cd='L [tC2l +(l-t)czz -R6(l-K)]p(e) 
6 
[56] 
The expected cost of the insurance may be considered also as a deadweight tax on individuals and so the welfare 
measure for deposit insurance will be: 
cert.equivalent(Uexante) -Cd(l +s) -[~ Gp(e) ](1 +s) e=4, 5,6 [57] 
where G is a subsidy received from the government to cover the liquidity shock, that is, in those states of nature 
in which tz is realized. 
5.- Comparison among the different public 
intervention measures: numerical examples 
The two public intervention measures discussed in the preceeding section, have been applied to the numerical 
example of section III. 
The costs of suspension of convertibility (in randomization in meeting liquidity needs) have been compared to 
those of deposit insurance (in deadweight taxation). 
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Figure 5 shows that in the numerical example of section III suspension of convertibility yields a higher level of 
utility than deposit insurance. 
With respect to the different suspension measures, suspensions of convertibility a (constant deduction to all type-
2 agents) or b (a proportional deduction of consumption to type-2 agents) yield a higher level of utility than c 
(it applies to the last agents arriving to the bank). 
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Figure 5.- Suspension of Convertibility versus Deposit Insurance 
However, the results are very sensitive to the exogenous parameters of the model. 
3.2 3.5 
In the numerical simulations, it has been assumed that with a high probability the lowest proportion of type-l 
agents (t l ) is realized (rl =0.99). The motivation for this assumption is to create confusion between a large 
withdrawal queue size at the bank, due to a high liquidity shock (t2 realized) or a negative information shock. 
It is also assumed that the probability of the low value of the random return occuring (RI) is sufficiently small 
(p=O.lO), and this allows to simplify the ex-ante contract maximization problem. 
The sensitivity analysis has been carried out with respect to the standard deviation of the random return, R, 
(keeping the mean return constant and increasing the dispersion of Ry2. 
Figure 6 shows the certainty equivalent of the utility attained with suspension of convertibility (c) minus deposit . 
insurance, as a function of the relative risk aversion coefficient (y) and for different values of the standard 
deviation of the random return (a). 
The first line (a =0.21) shows that for low values of y, suspension would be welfare superior, for intermediate 
values of y deposit insurance would be better (up to y = 1.70) and from then on, suspension yields again higher 
Comparison among the different public intervention measures: a numerical example 25 
0.04 r--------------------------, 
i ! 0.03 
E 
.E ! 0.02 
a. 
CD 
'a 
! 
c 
0.01 
E c 0.00 1----4a----->~-__+_+_------------_I 
o 
'ii 
c 8. -0.01 
! 
.!!. 
~-O.O2 
5 
-O.03I---r--r--r--r--r--'.--'.--'.--r--r--~ 
0.2 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.6 
Risk-Aversion coefftclent (Gamma) 
Figure 6.- Suspension of Convertibility versus Deposit Insurance, with s=0.20 
utility. As (J increases, suspension is welfare superior for nearly all levels of risk-aversion and for very' risky 
investments suspension would be always the preferred measure. These results support regulatory proposals that 
aim to restrict insured liabilities to finance very Iow risk assets. 
The range of parameters for which either measure would be preferred also depends on the exogenous value of 
the deadweight tax (s) or the random proportion of type-l agents (i\ 
Table IV summarizes how the welfare analysis (suspension of convertibility c minus deposit insurance) is 
affected by variations in the exogenous parameters of the model. 
6.- Conclusions and suggestions for further 
research 
This paper has introduced risk-averse preferences in Chari and Jagannathan'model. A first motivation for this 
extension was to give a positive role for a financial intermediary in the economy. 
The introduction of risk-aversion in the CH-J model, implies an ex-ante definition of the optimal insurance 
contract. This transformation service (through the demand deposit contract) is one of the important functions 
performed by banks. 
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Once the banking contract or ex-ante program has been designed, all agents solve their maximization problem 
in the interim period conditional on their information (if any) and they decide on their level of consumption for 
both periods. Conditions to assure bank-runs (both information-induced and "panic" runs) are derived. 
A second motivation for this extension was to complete Chari and Jagannathan's welfare analysis, by comparing 
suspension of convertibility versus deposit insurance, given their relative benefits and costs (of randomization 
in meeting liquidity needs or deadweight taxation). Three alternative mechanisms for the suspension measure 
have been introduced: A constant deduction of the consumption among all type-2 agents, a proportional 
deduction to the consumption among all type-2 agents and the "random queue" technique where the consumption 
deficit is supported by the OIast agents trying to convert their returns. 
The numerical results have shown that for low and very high levels of risk-aversion supension is welfare superior 
and in the intermediate cases deposit insurance would be better. Also, in all cases, as the dispersion of the 
random return increases, suspension of convertibility improves with respect to deposit insurance. For very risky 
investments, suspension would be the preferred measure to prevent runs. 
The range of parameters for which each measure is preferred also depends on the value of the deadweight tax 
and the proportion of early diers. Obviously, increasing the deadweight tax raises the cost of deposit insurance, 
and in a limit case, suspension would be welfare superior for all levels of risk aversion. Similarly, increasing 
the proportion of type- I agents raises the cost of suspension, and if the proportion of these early withdrawers 
is very large, then a measure of deposit insurance would be justified in this situation. 
However, a rigorous prescription of the optimal public intervention measure is difficult to be done as both 
measures have their shortcomings. Suspension of convertibility only provides temporary relief until the bank's 
doors reopen (this measure would only be effective if it could be applied until the bank's assets reach maturity, 
which does not seem plausible). Concerning deposit insurance, as already shown in earlier papers, is a measure 
that encourages an excessive risk-taking behaviour on the side of banks. It should be accompanied by additional 
banking regulation, as imposing restrictions on what banks can do, monitoring the banks continually, capital 
requirements or risk-sensitive insurance premiums. 
In general, the results of this paper support a radical policy proposal that aim to restrict insured liabilities to 
finance very Iow risk assets. This proposal, known as "narrow banking", would consist in dividing the banking 
industry into two types of banks: a "narrow" group of banks, whose deposits would be insured, and who are 
restricted in their assets' choices and a broad class of banks, with greater flexibility in the use of their uninsured 
deposits. The narrow banking idea has received support in the literature, among others, by Kareken [18], Boot 
and Greenbaum [7], JackIin [17] and Craine [10]. 
One way in which this model could be extended is to incorporate the linkage between runs on a particular bank 
and on the banking system as a whole, that is, a model to predict bank panics. 
For simplicity, liquidations costs have been neglected, it could be also interesting to see the effect in the results 
of considering a costly liquidation technology. 
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7.- Maximization problems 
7.1.- Ex-ante Contract 
The maximization problem is given by: 
I ( (k+c )1-y [(k+C )1-Y]) t PI 11 +(1-Pl)E 21 + l-y l-y [1] 
( 
(k+c )1-y [(k+C )1-Y])) 
+(I-t) P2 12 +(I-P2)E 22 l-y l-y 
s.t. 
[2] 
In this maximization problem, it can be shown that the incentive constraint for type-l agents is never binding 
and that of type-2 agents may be binding (depending on the exogenous parameters that are considered, as will 
be seen below). 
The F.O.C to the above maximization problem are: 
27 
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aL =[(k+CZ1rY (l-p) +P(k+CZ1 RI)-Y RI]it (1-Pl)-(1-PZ),3]--t )'1=0 aCZ1 Rh Rh Rh 
aL =(k+cIZ)-Y[(l-t)pz +PzA3]-(1-t)AI =0 aCIZ 
aL =[(k +C22)-Y (l-p) + P(k + Cn RI )-Y RI][(1-t) (1 - P2) + (1 - P2) ),3]- (1 -t) ),1 =0 aCn Rh Rh Rh 
aL =l-t(Cll + C
21 )-(I-t)(CI2 + C
22 )=0 
a)' I Rh Rh 
aL (k+CI2)1-y (k+C22)1-y (k+clI)l-y (k+c )l-y 
-=P +(l-p)E -P -(l-p)E ZI =0 
a),3 2 1 -y 2 l-y 2 l-y 2 l-y 
The new unknowns are introduced: 
clj=clj+k 
c2j=c2j+k where: j=I, 2 
Given that PI-I, it is assumed the corner solution c21 =k (or C21 =0). 
i).- The two incentive constraints are never binding (),z =0, ),3 =0). 
The first order conditions become: 
aL _ A-Y ~ -0 
-aA -cll tPl -t"'l -
cll 
a~ =c;i (I-P)t(1-Pl) __ t A1 ;S;0 aC21 Rh 
~L =C;2Y (1-t)P2-(1-t»,1=0 
aC12 
a~ =c;; (l-p) (I-t)(I- Pz} - (I-t) Al =0 
aC22 Rh 
aL ( 1 ) ( C21 ) ( C22 ) -=1+ 1+- k-t C +- -(l-t) C +- =0 aA Rh 11 Rh 12 Rh 
1 
From [5][a] and [5][c]: From [5][a] and [5][d]: 
[a] 
[b) 
[c) 
[d) 
[e) 
A _[(1-P)(1-p2)Rhl~ A 
C22 - Cll 
PI 
[6] 
Substituting [6] and [7] in [5][e] the value of cll is obtained. 
In this case it is assumed that the incentive constraint for type-2 agents is not binding, that is: 
[a] 
[b) 
[cl 
[3] 
[d) 
[e) 
[f] 
[4] 
[5] 
[7] 
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Substituting the optimal consumption levels in the above expression, a condition on the relative risk-aversion 
coefficient (y) for this case to hold is obtained. 
ii).- The incentive constraint for type-] agents is not binding and that oftype-2 is binding (A2 =0, A3>0). The 
first order conditions become: 
From [9][c]: 
From [9][d]: 
From [10] and [11]: 
From [9][a]: 
From [10] and [13]: 
a!: =e;l(tPI-P2 A3)-tAI=0 &11 
~L =e;i (I-p) [t(I - PI) - (1 - pz) A3] - _t Al ~O 
~I ~ 
~L =e;;[(1-t) Pz + Pz A3] - (1-t) A\ =0 (Jc IZ 
a!: = e;; (I-p) [(1 -t)(I - Pz) + (1 - Pz) A3] - (1 - t) Al =0 
&zz Rh 
Al ] A =-(I-t) 1---3 ._y 
clZ Pz 
A = - (1 - t)[ 1 - ___ A----=I'---__ ] 
3 e;; Rh(1-p)(l - pz) 
[a] 
[b] 
[cl 
[9] 
[d) 
[10] 
[11] 
[12] 
[13] 
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where: ~ { [ 1 lIlY ) k-t Cl2 -P2 M=I+k+ Rh + Rh (t-l) (l-p)Rh-p;- +Rh 
[15] 
t ~ 1..1 B= D(c )=-(I-t) P2 IZ Pz 
Substituting in [9][e], [12] and [14]: 
[16] 
Subsituting in [9][f1: 
[17] 
The solution to the non linear equation [12] yields a value for elZ ' and from it the rest of the unknowns of the 
problem are obtained. 
The ex-ante contract has been solved assuming RI-O. The more general case in which RI'IO (sensitivity analysis 
with respect to R) has been solved applying the Newton-Raphson technique to the F.O.C in Equation [3]. 
7.2.- Ex-Post Problem 
7.2.1.- Type-1 agents 
The value of III is chosen in order to maximize their utility function and subject to their two period constraint; 
that is: 
1 (k+c)l-y [- (k+C)I-Y (k+cz:ry} max PI I +(l-PI) (l-p) 2 +p-'-------'-1'1 1 - Y 1 - y 1 -y [18] 
S.t Cl =C12 + III (Cll -cI2) 
C2 =C21 +(l-IlI)(C22 -C21) 
IlIsl 
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The F.O.C of the problem are: 
[19] 
and given that Pt"! the multiplier associated with the constraint is: 
[20] 
and therefore the constraint is always binding, that is, III =1 
7.2.2.- Informed type-2 agents 
In each state and conditional on the information about R they solve the following problem: 
(k+C)I-Y [(k+C)I-Yj_] 
max=P2 I +(1-P2)E 2 R 
1'1 1-y !-y 
with: Cl =C12 + Il/(C ll -C12) 
Cz =C21 + (l-Il[)(CZ2 -CZI) 
1l[~1 
[21] 
[22] 
There are two different values for Ill' depending on the information about the random return (R) received by 
these agents at T=1. 
a.- If R=Rh is the information received at date I, then the informed type-2 agents find their consumption 
by solving the following problem: 
The F.O.C of the problem are: 
with solution: 
with CI =c12 + Il/(cll -CI2) 
CZ=CZI +(1-Il[)(CZ2 -CZI) 
1l[~1 
[23] 
[24] 
[25] 
[26] 
b.- If R=Rl is the value of R revealed to type-2 agents, then the level of consumption is obtained in a 
similar way as above: 
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[27] 
with: Cl =C12 + 1J./(Cll -CI2) 
Cz =C21 + (1-1J.})(c22 -C2l) [28] 
IJ.rd 
The F.O.C of the problem are: 
[29] 
and therefore the value of Al is: 
[30] 
which implies IJ.r=l 
8.- Proof of Proposition 1 
Proposition I assures that the optimal choice of uninformed type-2 agents in states 3,4 and 6 is 11; =1, that is, 
the choice of the type-l contract. 
First, considering states 3 and 4 and due to the existence of conditional probabilities, three different expressions 
for the utility function, OF(1J.2) ' can be written: 
1 ).-
2).-
If 1J.2=1 then aggregate consumption at date 1 would be the same for states 1, 3, 4 and 6 and so the 
conditional probabilities would be the ones given by 1t I and 1t2 and the utility function is: 
~·1 ~·1 
[ ( 
Rl)I-V 
_ (k+c
ll
) I-V (k+C21)I-V k+c21 Rh OF( =1)-P2 +(l-P2) 1t1 + 1t2 
"2 1 -y 1 -y ~·1 l-y ~.1 
[31] 
If 0< 1J.2 < 1 then, there is only confusion between states 3 and 4 and the conditional probabilities would 
be given by: 
(l-p)r2 (1-q) 
r tpq+r2(1-q) 
The expression for the utility function would be: 
Ct =C12 + 1J.2(CII -Ct2) 
pert q +r2 (l-q)] 
r lpq+r2 (1-q) 
c2 =C21 +(1-1J.2)(c22 -c21) 
[32] 
[33] 
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3).- Finally, if 1!2=O, there is confusion among states 3, 4 and 513, then the conditional probabilities would 
be 'It 1 and 'lt2 and the utility function: 
~o() ~o(J 
First remark: 
that is, 
1im OFO<I'<1 =OFI'_1 
1'-1 
[34] 
[35] 
[36] 
The utility function is continuous for 1!2 >0 14, and hence in order to assure a maximum at I!; = 1, the following 
condition(s) should hold: 
[37] 
[38] 
The first of these conditions is only needed when the utility function is discontinous in 1!2 = O. 
In order to assure that the second condition holds, it is only necessary to look for the extreme value of q for 
which the following condition is satisfied: 
[39] 
Finally, with respect to state 6, there are two different expressions for the utility function: 
1 ).- For any ° ~ 1!2 < 1 , state 6 is never confounded with any other state and so the uninformed type-2 agents 
assign probability one to being in state 6. The utility function is given by: 
[40] 
Cl =C12 + 1!2(Cn -CI2) 
C2 = C21 + (l-1!2)( C22 -C21) 
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If 112=1, the utility function coincides with that of states 3 and 4, that is given in equation [31]. 
It can be shown, as before, the continuity of the utility function, and so we just need to impose that: 
and this condition is always satisfied. 
9.- Numerical Example 
Input Data 
Proportions of type-1 agents 
Probabilities of the above proportions 
Proportions of informed type-2 agents 
Probabilities of the above proportions 
Low and high random returns 
Probabilities of the low and high returns 
Liquidation cost 
Mimimum risk-aversion coefficient 
Maximum risk-aversion coefficient 
Incrementum of the risk-aversion coefficient 
Intertemporal coefficients of types 1, 2 agents 
Ex-ante contract 
cll c21 c12 c22 
1.24D+00 O.OOD+OO 4.12D-01 7.2SD-01 
Ex-post 
Type-1 agents 
mu cc11 cc21 
1.00D+00 1. 24D+00 O.OOD+OO 
Informed type-2 agents 
State mu cc12i cc22i 
1 O.OOD+OO O.OOD+OO O.OOD+OO 
2 2.93D-01 6.SSD-01 S . 13D-01 
3 1.00D+00 1. 24D+00 O.OOD+OO 
4 O.OOD+OO O.OOD+OO O.OOD+OO 
S 2.93D-Ol 6.SSD-Ol S . 13D-01 
6 1. OOD+OO 1. 24D+00 O.OOD+OO 
[41] 
to=O.OO t1=0.30 t2=0.Sl 
rO=O.OO r1=0.99 r2=0.01 
0=0.00 a=0.30 
1-q=0.10 q=0.90 
RI=O.OO Rh=1.S0 
p=0.10 1-p=0.90 
aa=O.OO 
't1=1. SO 
't2=1. SO 
d't=0.10 
rho1=1.00 rho2=0.SO 
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Uninformed Type-2 agents 
State mu cc12 cc22 
1 3.60D-Ol 7.l1D-Ol 4.l8D-Ol 
2 2.90D-Ol 6.53D-Ol 5.l5D-Ol 
3 1. OOD+OO 1. 24D+OO 3.l7D-27 
4 1. OOD+OO 1. 24D+OO 4.28D-07 
5 2.90D-Ol 6.53D-Ol 5.l5D-Ol 
6 1.OOD+OO 1.24D+OO 3.l7D-27 
Suspension A 
Type-l agents 
ccll cc2l 
1. 24D+OO O.OOD+OO 
Informed type-2 agents 
State cc12i cc22i 
1 O.OOD+OO O.OOD+OO 
2 6.55D-Ol 5.13D-Ol 
3 6.61D-Ol O.OOD+OO 
4 O.OOD+OO O.OOD+OO 
5 4.l4D-Ol 5.13D-Ol 
6 4.l2D-Ol O.OOD+OO 
Uninformed Type-2 agents 
State cc12 cc22 
1 6.61D-Ol 4.l8D-Ol 
2 6.53D-Ol 5.15D-Ol 
3 6.61D-Ol 3.l7D-27 
4 4.l2D-Ol 4.28D-07 
5 4.l1D-Ol 5.l5D-Ol 
6 4.l2D-Ol 3.17D-27 
Suspension B 
Type-l agents 
ccll cc2l 
1.24D+OO O.OOD+OO -
Informed type-2 agents 
State cc12i cc22i 
1 O.OOD+OO O.OOD+OO 
2 6.55D-Ol 5.l3D-Ol 
3 6.61D-Ol O.OOD+OO 
4 O.OOD+OO O.OOD+OO 
5 4.13D-Ol 5.13D-Ol 
6 4.l2D-Ol O.OOD+OO 
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Uninformed Type-2 agents 
State cc12 cc22 
1 6.61D-01 4.18D-01 
2 6.53D-01 5.15D-01 
3 6.61D-01 3.17D-27 
4 4.12D-01 4.28D-07 
5 4.12D-01 5.15D-01 
6 4.12D-01 3.17D-27 
Suspension C 
Type-1 agents 
cc11 cc21 
Quick 1.24D+00 O.OOD+OO 
Slow 4.12D-01 O.OOD+OO 
Informed type-2 agents 
State cc12i cc22i 
1 O.OOD+OO O.OOD+OO 
2 6.55D-01 5.13D-01 
3 1. 24D+00 O.OOD+OO 
4 O.OOD+OO O.OOD+OO 
5 6.55D-01 5.13D-01 
6 1. 24D+00 O.OOD+OO 
Uninformed Type-2 agents 
State cc12 cc22 
1 7.llD-01 4.18D-01 
2 6.53D-01 5.15D-01 
3 1. 24D+00 3.17D-27 
4 1. 24D+00 4.28D-07 
5 6.53D-01 5.15D-01 
6 1. 24D+00 3.17D-27 
Informed type-2 agents (Slow) 
State Beta % cc12i cc22i 
1 7.61 4.12D-01 O.OOD+OO 
2 0.00 4.12D-01 5.13D-01 
3 49.00 4.12D-01 O.OOD+OO 
4 49.00 4.12D-01 O.OOD+OO 
5 21. 84 4.12D-01 5.13D-01 
6 49.00 4.12D-01 O.OOD+OO 
Uninformed Type-2 agents (Slow) 
State cc12 cc22 
1 4.12D-01 4.18D-01 
2 4.12D-01 5.15D-01 
3 4.12D-01 3.17D-27 
4 4.12D-01 4.28D-07 
5 4.12D-01 5.15D-01 
6 4.12D-01 3.17D-27 
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Ex-ante aggregate' consumption 
CTl CT2 CT1+Subsidy 
6.63D-Ol 5.06D-Ol 8.35D-Ol 
Ex-post aggregate consumption 
State CTl CT2 Deficit 
1 8.70D-Ol 2.92D-Ol 3.48D-02 
2 8.30D-Ol 3.60D-Ol O.OOD+OO 
3 1. 24D+OO 1.55D-27 4.06D-Ol 
4 1. 24D+OO 2.10D-07 4.06D-Ol 
5 9.53D-Ol 2.52D-Ol 1.18D-Ol 
6 1.24D+OO 1. 09D-27 4.06D-Ol 
Ex-post aggregate consumption with suspension 
State CTl CT2 
1 8.35D-Ol 2.92D-Ol 
2 8.30D-Ol 3.60D-Ol 
3 8.35D-Ol 1.55D-27 
4 8.35D-Ol 2.10D-07 
5 8.35D-Ol 2.52D-Ol 
6 8.35D-Ol 1. 09D-27 
Welfare measures 
Deposit Suspen. A Suspen. B Suspen. C 
6.27D-Ol 6.94D-Ol 6.94D-Ol 6.86D-Ol 
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Table 1.- Summary of events 
I Unit 
Intermediary Inflows 
Ex ante identical agents 
Intermediary Outflows 
Preference shock realized 
Information shock realized 
40 
Random return realized 
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Table 11.- States of Nature 
tl OR '1 (l-q) tl CC11 +(1-t1)cc12 
2 tl aRh '1 (1-p)q tl CC11 + (1- t1)[a CC1ZH + (1- a )cc1Z] 
3 tl aRl 'lPq t1cc11 +(1-t1)[acc1ZL +(l-a)ccd c11 
4 tz 0 R '2(1-q) tzcc11 +(1-t2)cc12 Cll 
5 t2 a Rh 'z(1-p)q t2cc11 +(1-t2)[acc12H+(1-a)cclZ] 
6 tz a Rl '2Pq t2 CC11 + (1 - t2)[ a CC12L + (1 - a) CC12] Cll 
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Table 111.- Numerical example 
6 
1.00 
Table IV 
Increase in the standard deviation of the random return Increase 
(0) 
Increase in the deadweight tax 
Increase in the proportion of 
type-l agents 
Increase in relative risk-aversion 
(s) Increase 
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( y ) Decrease (for low y) 
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Notes 
1. One interpretation of this assumption is that the asset represents long-term loans which cannot be "called in" early and for which no 
secondary market exists perhaps due to a "lelllmons" problem. as in Akerlt!f [I J. 
2. This assumption. as in Bhattacharya and Jacklin [2J. is motivated by the fact that. if information were costly. type-2 agents would be 
more likely to purchase the information. and also if depositors were (if different sizes. larger depositors would also be more likely to 
purchase the iI!formation. These unmodeled aspects are taken into account. by considering that a random proportion ex (if type-2 agents 
becomes iI!formed. 
3. This fUllctioll solves the problem (!f zero consumption having an il!finite negative value in terms of utility. when y is greater than one. 
4. 
~=1 
~=O 
0<~<1 
Formally. this represents the choice Fir the depositor (!f ~ (O~~d): 
implies the choice (!f the type-I COil tract (cll • C21 ) 
implies the choice (!f the type-2 contract (CI2• c22 ) 
implies a combillation (!f the two COli tracts 
5. This simplification is justified by the ':first-come~tirst-served" lIature (!f the deposit contract. 
6. See Jacklill alld Bhattacllllrya [2J Fir a proof (!f this result. 
7. eq (i. j = I. 2) are the olles givell by equatioll [17]. 
8. The workillg procedure is a computer program that has beell written in Ms-Dos Qbasic. 
9. This example is sholl'lI ill more detail ill Appelldix 9. 
10. Note the \'(/lue (!f ~2 (in states 3. 4 alld 6). ~I alld IJI ill Table Jll 
11. See deposit illsurance in the lIext Sectioll 4.2. 
12. The assumptioll RI-O has beell relaxed. although sufficiently small values for RI have been considered so that bad information about 
asset quality leads always to a run. See Appendix 7.1 Fir the calculation procedure in this case. 
13. This cOllfusioll ollly occurs if in Firmed type-2 agellts have also chosen IJ; =0 in state 5. otherwise. if 1J2 =0 there is only confusion 
betweell states 3 alld 4 and therefore the cOllditiollal probabilities alld the utility functioll would coincide with those expressed in point 2). 
14. Or tile utility fUllctiOll may be cOlltillUOUS ill the illterval [0.1] whellever poillts 2) and 3) coincide. as explained in footnote 13. 
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